This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not.
PART I1. Introduction: Self-Control and Personal Autonomy
2. Better Judgement: Nature and Function
3. Exercising Self-Control: A Motivational Problem
4. Self-Control,
Akrasia, and Second-Order Desires
5. Self-Control and Belief
6. Self-Control,
Akrasia, and Emotion
7. The Upper Reaches of Self-Control and the Ideally Self-Controlled Person
PART II8. Transistion: From Self-Control to Autonomy
9. Psychological Autonomy and Personal History
10. Compatibilist Autonomy and Autonomous Action
11. Problems for Libertarians
12. Incompatibilist Autonomy and Autonomous Action
13. Assessing the Denial of Autonomy
References
Index
Mele's presentation is philosophically rigorous yet accessible to the non-philosopher. The author demonstrates an impressive grasp of historical and contemporary aspects of the freewill debate and builds upon his earlier work. --
Choice Mele is a clear and careful writer. His book challenges the reader to reflect seriously on the meaning of self-control and autonomy....Mele has hit his mark in this well-argued, engaging, and thought-provoking book. --
The Review of Metaphysics ...this is a great book. It is rich in arguments, replete with uselB