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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism The Puzzle of Distributive Politics [Paperback]

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  • Category: Books (Political Science)
  • Author:  Stokes, Susan C., Dunning, Thad, Nazareno, Marcelo, Brusco, Valeria
  • Author:  Stokes, Susan C., Dunning, Thad, Nazareno, Marcelo, Brusco, Valeria
  • ISBN-10:  1107660394
  • ISBN-10:  1107660394
  • ISBN-13:  9781107660397
  • ISBN-13:  9781107660397
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Pages:  344
  • Pages:  344
  • Binding:  Paperback
  • Binding:  Paperback
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2013
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2013
  • SKU:  1107660394-11-MPOD
  • SKU:  1107660394-11-MPOD
  • Item ID: 100169220
  • Seller: ShopSpell
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  • Delivery by: Dec 30 to Jan 01
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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections.Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable  and illegal  to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.Part I. Modalities of Distribulsj
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