Brute Rationality Normativity and Human Action [Hardcover]

This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action.This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Joshua Gert argues that rather than simply 'counting in favor of' action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. His book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Joshua Gert argues that rather than simply 'counting in favor of' action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. His book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.Joshua Gert presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. He argues that, rather than simply counting in favor of action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles--that of requiring action and that of justifying action. Gert's book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reasoning in particular, and moral theory more generally.Preface and acknowledgements; 1. What would an adequate theory of rationality be like?; 2. Practical rationality, morality and purely justificatory reasons; 3. The criticism from internalism about practical reasons; 4. A functional role analysis of reasons; 5. Accounting for our actual normative judgements; 6. Fitting the view into the contemporary debate; 7. Two concepts of rationality; 8. Internalism and different kinds of reasons; 9. Brute rationality; References; Index. It is a great contribution to contemporary philosophical debate and is likely to make an impact.
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