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Deliberate Discretion The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy [Hardcover]

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  • Category: Books (Political Science)
  • Author:  Huber, John D., Shipan, Charles R.
  • Author:  Huber, John D., Shipan, Charles R.
  • ISBN-10:  0521817447
  • ISBN-10:  0521817447
  • ISBN-13:  9780521817448
  • ISBN-13:  9780521817448
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Pages:  304
  • Pages:  304
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2002
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2002
  • SKU:  0521817447-11-MPOD
  • SKU:  0521817447-11-MPOD
  • Item ID: 100753920
  • Seller: ShopSpell
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  • Delivery by: Jan 28 to Jan 30
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This book explains the different approaches legislators use when they write laws.Who makes policy? Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why, and when, legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the U.S. states to provide support for our argument. Our argument and evidence provide numerous insights into the reasons for delegation and bureaucratic discretion, as well as insights into the normative consequences of incentives to limit discretion.Who makes policy? Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why, and when, legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the U.S. states to provide support for our argument. Our argument and evidence provide numerous insights into the reasons for delegation and bureaucratic discretion, as well as insights into the normative consequences of incentives to limit discretion.The laws that legislatures adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary l3|
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