Economics of Accounting: Performance Evaluation [Paperback]

This book provides an integrated, technical exposition of key concepts in agency theory, with particular emphasis on analyses of the economic consequences of the characteristics of contractible performance measures, such as accounting reports. It provides a succinct source for learning the fundamentals of the economics of incentives. It will appeal to accounting researchers as well as those in other disciplines who are interested in the economics of management incentives.

Foreword to Volume I.- Preface to Volume I.- Preface to Volume II.- Introduction to Performance Evaluation.- Optimal Contracts.- Ex Post Performance Measures.- Linear Contracts.- Multiple Tasks and Multiple Performance Measures.- Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers as Performance Measures.- Post-contract, Pre-decision Information.- Pre-contract Information - Uninformed Principal Moves First.- Intra-period Contract Renegotiation.- Multi-period Contracts with Full Commitment and Independent Periods.- Timing and Correlation of Reports in a Multi-period LEN Model.- Full Commitment Contacts with Interdependent Periods.- Inter-period Contract Renegotiation.- Contracting with Multiple Productive Agents.- Contracting with a Productive Agent and a Monitor.- References.- Author Index.- Subject Index.

Peter Christensen holds a Masters Degree in Mathematical Economics from Aarhus University, 1983, and a Doctors Degree in Economics from Odense University, 1990. He has taught finance and accounting at Odense University (later University of Southern Denmark) since 1983, and he became a Professor of Management in 1991. He has published widely in Danish and leading international journals of accounting and finance. As part of his Ph.D. studies at Odense University he was a visiting Ph.D. student at the University of British Columbia in 1985-1986. This visit initiated his long-time research collaboration with Jerry Feltham, which is the basis for their two recent books: Economics of Accounlă