A study in the philosophy of mind and the debate about emotions, objects and man.A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour.A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour.A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural difference causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences.Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Causal relations; 3. Non-contingent relations; 4. Kenny's aim; 5. Kenny's arguments; 6. Objects: delimitation of scope; 7. Objects: logico-grammatical criteria; 8. Objects: two methods of approach; 9. Emotion and object: reactions to events; 10. Emotion and object: the general condition; 11. Emotion and object: some residual problems; 12. Immediacy and incorrigibility; 13. First-person privilege; 14. Attention and object; 15. Intentionality; 16lãÏ