Evidence and Inquiry Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology [Paperback]

In this important new work, Haack develops an original theory of empirical evidence or justification, and argues its appropriateness to the goals of inquiry. In so doing, Haack provides detailed critical case studies of Lewis's foundationalism; Davidson's and Bonjour's coherentism; Popper's 'epistemology without a knowing subject'; Quine's naturalism; Goldman's reliabilism; and Rorty's, Stich's, and the Churchlands' recent obituaries of epistemology.Preface.

Introduction.

1. Foundationalism versus Coherentism: The Dichotomy Disclaimed.

2. Foundationalism Undermined.

3. Coherentism Discomposed.

4. Foundherentism Articulated.

5. The Evidence of the Senses: Refutations and Conjectures.

6. Naturalism Disambiguated.

7. The Evidence Against Reliabilism.

8. Revolutionary Scientism Subverted.

9. Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect.

10. Foundherentism Ratified.

Notes.

Bibliography of Works Cited.

Index.

.philosophers will enjoy Haack's verve, and profit from her many insights. Jonathatn Vogel, Amherst College, Book Reviews

This book is at once a fine introduction and a significant contribution to contemporary epistemology. In addition to elaborating and persuasively defending a position of her own which adroitly steers between the Scylla of apriorism and the Charybdis of scientism, Haack discusses and makes powerful and highly detailed criticisms of the views of a range of contemporary philosophers - Sir Karl Popper, W. V. O. Quine, Richard Rorty, Alvin Goldman, and Paul and Patricia Churchland, among others - criticisms to which these philosophers and their numerous admirers will have to reply. Hilary Putnam, Harvard University

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