In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of the compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interpreted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate.
There can be little doubt that the author is absolutely correct about the importance of seeing Hume's discussion...within the context of his naturalized and 'sentimentalized' theory of moral responsibility...An important and valuable work that should be welcomed by students of Hume and by anyone interested in issues of moral freedom and moral responsibility...The overall quality of both the exposition and the critical analysis is very high indeed. --Don Garrett, New York University
Russell's book, which is the first full analysis of Hume's theories on this key theme, does justice to their complexity and systematic character, and by relating them to more recent debates shows us, once again, why Hume remains such a continual source of philosophical stimulus. It [Russell's book] is excellent, creative scholarship. --Terry Penelhum,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Russell's book makes an lÃç