Getting to Yes in Korea [Hardcover]

President George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an axis of evil but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea's nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea's plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward. Clemens distils lessons from U.S. negotiations with North Korea, Russia, China, and Libya and analyses how they do-and do not-apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era.Chapter 1: How Korea Became Critical Chapter 2: How Korea Became Korea Chapter 3: How Korea Became Japan Chapter 4: How One Korea Became Two Chapter 5: How North Korea Got the Bomb Chapter 6: How Kissinger and Zhou Enlai Got To Yes Chapter 7: How To Get To Yes Across Cultures Chapter 8: How Carter and Clinton Got To Yes With Pyongyang Chapter 9: How Bush and Kim Jong Il Got To Deadlock Chapter 10: How Free Will Can Get Past Forces and Fortuna Chapter 11: How To Get Past The Worst and Move To Better Futures Chapter 12: How Should Obama Deal With Authoritarians? Written with great verve and interesting asides Asian Affairs

This book points to valuable lessons from the approaches to North Korea taken by Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton compared to those taken by George W. Bush and his entourage. Drawing on the value-creating/value-claiming framework of the Harvard Negotiation Project and his own studies of security negotiations with Moscow and with Beijing, Professor Clemens suggests guidelines for moving the Korean peninsula from a flash point to a zone of peace and cooperation. As this book makes clear, negotialS.