This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define.? Contributors draw on lessons from?philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute?goods.
- Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory
- Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation
- Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making
- Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes
Preface to Volume 2
Part 5: Foundations. 13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow) 14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen). 15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond) 16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. Lopez-Calva)
Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes. 17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark) 18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent) 19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb)
Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice 20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett) 21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson) 22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet) 23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura) 24.?Freedom, opportunity and l