Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making [Paperback]

Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (? 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. The hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings, which was developed using a decision model, is experimentally confirmed. Moreover, the author analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.InInsolvency Timing as an Agency Problem.- Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing.-?Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision.- Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments.

Frederik Drescher holds a degree in Business Administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management and wrote his doctoral thesis at Technische Universit?t M?nchen under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl. He is a consultant with a special focus on corporate restructuring.

Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (? 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.

?

Contents

????????? Insolvency Timing as an Agency Problem

????????? Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing

????????? Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision

????????? Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments

?

?

?

Target Groups

????????? Researchers and students in the field of business economics with a focus on corporate restrlҦ