A Copernican Critique of Kantian Idealism [Hardcover]

This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that objects conform to our cognition from the perspective of a Copernican worldview which stands diametrically opposed to Kants because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kants ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of experience and objectivity, Ryall argues that Kants transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing that is essential for Copernicus and the only thing that would validate a comparison between his and Kants critical philosophy, namely the subject as revolving object. It is only by presupposing  in a transcendentally realistic sense  that human beings exist as physical things in themselves, therefore, that the observer motion of Copernican theory is vindicated and the distorted nature of our empirical observations explained. In broadly accessible prose and by directly challenging the arguments of many stalwart defenders of Kant including Norman Kemp Smith, Henry E. Allison and Michael Friedman, Ryalls book will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kants philosophy alike.

1. Introduction.- 2. Reversing Perspectives.- 3. Experience and the Human Object.- 4. Experience and Physical Reality.- 5. Kants Applied Metaphysics.- 6. Transcending Experience.- 7. The WorldMind Relation.- 8. Making Room for Faith.- 9. Conclusion.- Index.

J. T. W. Ryall teaches philosophy at Cardiff University, UK. This is his first book.

This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that objects conform to our cognition from the perspective of a Copernican worldview which stands diametrically opposed to Kants because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kants ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesl1