An examination of the political and economic causes and consequences of the Asian financial crises.This book analyses the recent Asian financial crisis, the architecture of global finance and the relationship between the two. The editors take a comparative, multidisciplinary and structural focus to the issues which does not depend too heavily on an economic or a geopolitical approach. The strong comparative perspective of the book offers insights into why some economies in Asia were affected more severely than others in the recent crisis.This book analyses the recent Asian financial crisis, the architecture of global finance and the relationship between the two. The editors take a comparative, multidisciplinary and structural focus to the issues which does not depend too heavily on an economic or a geopolitical approach. The strong comparative perspective of the book offers insights into why some economies in Asia were affected more severely than others in the recent crisis.The financial crises across Asia in 1997-98 ignited fierce debate about domestic economic weaknesses and flaws in the international financial system. Some analysts blamed Asian governments for inadequate prudential supervision, widespread failures of corporate governance and even crony capitalism. Others assailed the inherent instability of global financial markets and what they considered to be hasty and ill-conceived liberalization taken at the behest of western-dominated international financial institutions. In this volume a distinguished group of political scientists, economists, and practitioners examines the political and economic causes and consequences of the crisis. To what extent were domestic economic factors to blame for the crisis? Why were some economies more prone to crisis than others? What are the costs and benefits of international financial liberalization? Who bears the risks and the costs of measures taken to reduce them? And what are the prospects for reform of the Interl3%