The Essence of the Self In Defense of the Simple Vie of Personal Identity [Hardcover]

In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the simple or anti-criterial view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes (a) that there is always a gap between A is fand g and Iam fand g; (b), that a complete description of the world offered without recourse to indexicals will fail to account for the contingent truth that Iam one of the persons described; and (c), that an account of conscious perspectives on the world must take into account what it means for an apparently arbitrary one of these perspectives to be mine. Engaging with contemporary positions on the first person, embodiment, psychological continuity, and other ongoing arguments, Madell contends that there can be no such thing as a criterion of personal identity through time, that no bodily or psychological continuity approach to the issue can succeed, and that personal identity through time must be absolute, not a matter of degree. Madells view that the nature of the self is substantively different from that of objects in the world will generate significant discussion and debate among philosophers of mind.

1. Personal Identity and the First Person  2. The First Person  3. Body  4. Psychology  5. Persons and Possible Worlds  6. Retrospect

Madell argues with admirable ambition and tenacity... [The Essence of the Self] constitutes a rewarding read.

- Daniel Giberman, University of Gothenburg, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Madells focus centers on making ls8