Moral Realism A Defence [Paperback]

Moral Realismis a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.

I. REALISM AND ITS CRITICS
1. The Non-cognitivist Challenge
2. The Constructivist Challenge
II. MORAL METAPHYSICS
3. Ethical Non-naturalism
4. Supervenience and Causation
III. MORAL MOTIVATION
5. Motivational Humeanism
6. Motivational Judgement Internalism
IV. MORAL REASONS
7. Reasons Internalism
8. Moral Rationalism
9. Rationality and Disagreement
V. MORAL KNOWLEDGE
10. Moral Scepticism
11. The Justification of Moral Principles
12. The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs
References
Index

...a carefully developed defense of a nonnaturalistic moral realism. Shafer-Landau covers a wide range of material, presenting an impressive array of arguments both in providing positive support for his position and undermining opposing views...this book will be the focus of much attention in metaethical discussion. --The Review of Metaphysics

A book of remarkable scope and ambition...clear and engaging throughout...[Shafer-Landau] develops a number of novel arguments for what is sure to be a controversial set of mutually supporting and philosophically interesting positions...very much worth reading. It is also accessible and engaging enough to be useful for teaching advanced undergraduates. --Michael Ridge,Australasian Journal of Philosophy