The Non-Reality of Free Will [Hardcover]

The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion.

Both engaging and provocative....Is sure to provide even its critics with challenging insights and arguments. --Philosophical Review

Double has given us an informed, insightful, and clearly written book....Uniformly instructive....He writes clearly and honestly, exhibits a solid command of contemporary treatments of free will, and has an admirable ability to get to the heart of the difficulties affecting the proposals under scrutiny. --No?s

A lively, thoughtful, well-informed book. The reader will find many insights along the way. --Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

A comprehensive and carefull discussion of the standard varieties of free will positions, both historical and recent....Rich and provocative....Double has skillfully navigated waters...and has reached an original,hitherto unexplored position. It is well worth the time of any philosophical voyager to read his account of the journey. --Teaching Philosophy

Well worth reading....Double draws intelligently upon cognate literature in the philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and metaethics to construct a wide varietyl3K