This book provides a new philosophical fictionalism to solve traditional paradoxes and puzzles in the philosophy of language and metaphysics.Distinguishing and evaluating different fictionalist approaches in philosophy, this book explains how a particular philosophical fictionalism can solve a wide range of traditional philosophical puzzles and paradoxes. It is of interest to scholars and upper-level students of the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, logic, epistemology, linguistics, and metaphysics.Distinguishing and evaluating different fictionalist approaches in philosophy, this book explains how a particular philosophical fictionalism can solve a wide range of traditional philosophical puzzles and paradoxes. It is of interest to scholars and upper-level students of the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, logic, epistemology, linguistics, and metaphysics.In this book, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish various species of fictionalism, locating and defending their own version of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that arise from ordinary language, they consider such issues as the problem of non-being, plural identity claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, meaning attributions, and truth-talk. They consider 'deflationism about truth', explaining why deflationists should be fictionalists, and show how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its kin. They further explore the semantic notions of reference and predicate-satisfaction, showing how philosophical fictionalism can also resolve puzzles that these notions appear to present. Their critical examination of fictionalist approaches in philosophy, together with the development and application of their own brand of philosophical fictionalism, will be of great interest to scholars and upper-level students of philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical logic, philosophy of ls*