Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In
Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call generalism as a regulative ideal.
1. The many moral particularisms
2. Holism about reasons
3. Default reasons
4. Moral vision
5. Constitutive generalism
6. From moral knowledge to default principles
7. Beyond default principles or trimming the hedges
8. Generalism as a regulative ideal
9. Principled guidance
Appendix
Despite the attractions of particularism, most philosophers feel that it misses something. McKeever and Ridge turn these vague worries into razor-sharp objections. Then they develop a moderate alternative view of how principles work in morality. For anyone tempted to become a particularist, this book is a powerful deterrent. --Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Dartmouth College
All in all,
Principled Ethicsis a highly stimulating read. It moves the particularism debate on to a whole new level of sophistication, raising the bar that needs to be jumped by particularists considerably higher. At the same time, it provides new insights into the nature and value of moral principles for those of us that avow a firm commitment to them. --Daniel Star,
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews