This 1996 book provides an alternative theory of the will and of our capacity for decision-making.This book considers our freedom of action, and what sort of mind, or psychology, that freedom requires. It argues that our freedom of action depends on our being able to decide freely which actions we shall perform; in other words, to have freedom of action, we need a free will. It shows how our decisions to act are actions themselves, but with the special function of ensuring the rationality of the actions which they explain. The book seeks to resolve a range of problems about the nature both of action and rationality.This book considers our freedom of action, and what sort of mind, or psychology, that freedom requires. It argues that our freedom of action depends on our being able to decide freely which actions we shall perform; in other words, to have freedom of action, we need a free will. It shows how our decisions to act are actions themselves, but with the special function of ensuring the rationality of the actions which they explain. The book seeks to resolve a range of problems about the nature both of action and rationality.This book considers our freedom of action, and what sort of mind, or psychology, that freedom requires. It argues that our freedom of action depends on our being able to decide freely which actions we shall perform; in other words, to have freedom of action, we need a free will. It shows how our decisions to act are actions themselves, but with the special function of ensuring the rationality of the actions that they explain. The book seeks to resolve a range of problems about the nature both of action and rationality.Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1. Agency and the will; 2. Scepticism about second-order agency; 3. Decision-making and freedom; 4. The psychologising conception of freedom; 5. Decision rationality and action rationality; 6. Decision-making and teleology; 7. The regress argument; 8. In defence of the action model; 9. The spel“˜