In
Terror in the Balance, Posner and Vermeule take on civil libertarians of both the left and the right, arguing that the government should be given wide latitude to adjust policy and liberties in the times of emergency. They emphasize the virtues of unilateral executive actions and argue for making extensive powers available to the executive as warranted. The judiciary should neither second-guess security policy nor interfere on constitutional grounds. In order to protect citizens, government can and should use any legal instrument that is warranted under ordinary cost-benefit analysis. The value gained from the increase in security will exceed the losses from the decrease in liberty. At a time when the 'struggle against violent extremism' dominates the United States' agenda, this important and controversial work will spark discussion in the classroom and intellectual press alike.
Introduction
Part I: Constitutional Law and Theory1. Emergencies, Tradeoffs, and Deference
2. The Panic Theory
3. The Democratic Failure Theory
4. The Ratchet Theory and Other Long-Run Effects
Part II: Applications5. Institutional Alternatives to Judicial Deference
6. Coercive Interrogation
7. Speech, Due Process, and Political Trials
8. Military Force
Conclusion: Emergency Powers and Lawyers' Expertise
Notes
Index
Admirably clear and free of technical jargon, this is a relentlessly rational dissection of a topic confused by overstatement, opportunistic political posturing and just plain lack of common sense. If you are not convinced, you will be challenged to explain exactly why not. --Charles Fried, Harvard Law School
It is conventional wisdom that during times of war and emergency, presidents overreact to threats and excessively violate civil liberties, and courts do too little to stop these developments.
Terror in the Balancechallenges this conventional wisdom from top ls*