Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness [Paperback]

This book presents a dualistic view of the mind that goes against the dominant materialist views.Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness focuses on sensory experience and perception qualities to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences.This provocative book will interest students and professionals who work in the philosophy of mind and will also have cross-discplinary appeal in cognitive psychology and the brain sciences.Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness focuses on sensory experience and perception qualities to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences.This provocative book will interest students and professionals who work in the philosophy of mind and will also have cross-discplinary appeal in cognitive psychology and the brain sciences.Focusing on sensory experience and perception qualities to present a dualistic view of the mind (called Qualitative Event Realism), this book doesn't conform to the dominant materialist views. Its theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness now being pursued, not only by philosophers, but by researchers in psychology and the neurosciences.Part I: 1. Introduction; 2. Qualitative event realism; 3. Dualism; 4. Representationalism; 5. Transparency; 6. Higher order theories; 7. Monitoring; 8. Functionalism; 9. Scepticism and the causes of qualitative events; 10. Epiphenomenalism; Part II: 11. Unified dualism; 12. Patterns as causes of qualitative events; 13. A possible future. This book is almol£J