Why Inequality Matters Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value [Hardcover]

This book explores and defends the view that inequality is intrinsically bad when and because it leads to arbitrary disadvantage.This book brings together discussions of the moral value of inequality with luck- or responsibility-sensitive accounts of distributive justice to explore and defend the view that inequality is intrinsically bad, and it is bad when and because it leaves some worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own.This book brings together discussions of the moral value of inequality with luck- or responsibility-sensitive accounts of distributive justice to explore and defend the view that inequality is intrinsically bad, and it is bad when and because it leaves some worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own.Equality is a key concept in our moral and political vocabulary. There is wide agreement on its instrumental value and its favourable impact on many aspects of society, but less certainty over whether it has a non-instrumental or intrinsic value that can be demonstrated. In this project, Shlomi Segall explores and defends the view that it does. He argues that the value of equality is not reducible to a concern we might have for the worse off, or to ensuring that individuals do not fall into poverty and destitution; instead he claims that undeserved inequalities, wherever and whenever we might find them, are bad in themselves. Assessing the strength of competing accounts, such as sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, he brings together for the first time discussions of the moral value of equality with luck- or responsibility-sensitive accounts of distributive justice. His book will interest readers in political and moral philosophy.Part I. Egalitarianism: 1. The variety of objections to equality; 2. Why inequality matters; 3. When does inequality matter?; 4. Who is inequality bad for?; Part II. Alternatives to Egalitarianism: 5. What is the point of sufficiency?; 6. Prioritarianism and the person-affecting viewlÃ{